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SIN, SALVATION, AND THE LAW OF CHARITIES
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Regulation. By Marion R. Fremont-Smith. Belknap Press, 2004. 570
pages, $95.

Charity creates a multitude of sins.
— Oscar Wilde

1

INTRODUCTION
The United States has a larger collection of charitable
organizations than any other nation in the world, and the number
2
is growing quickly. In 1997, fully 5.8% of all of the legal entities in
3
the United States were nonprofits. Unfortunately, the growth of
4
the nonprofit sector is outstripping both the government and
5
business sectors. Despite a doubling in charitable giving and a
† Clerk to the Honorable Jill Flaskamp Halbrooks, Minnesota Court of
Appeals, 2004-05; J.D. 2004, magna cum laude, William Mitchell College of Law;
B.A. 1986, Business Administration, University of South Dakota; B.S. 1989,
Sociology, University of Iowa; M.A. 1995, Sociology, The Pennsylvania State
University; Ph.D. candidate, Sociology, University of Minnesota.
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM AND SELECTED CRITICAL
PROSE 128 (Penguin Books, 2001).
2. Stephanie Strom, Accountability; New Equation for Charities: More Money, Less
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17 2003, at F1.
3. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 7 (2004) [hereinafter GOVERNING].
4. Despite the name, nonprofits are not actually prohibited from earning a
profit; they are barred from distributing those profits to the organization’s
directors, officers or members. Excess revenues must either be saved or expended
to further the goals of the organization. Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good
(and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1307 (2003).
5. Strom, supra note 2, at F1 (noting that the Internal Revenue Service has
only 800 employees to monitor almost 1.6 million charities and other tax-exempt
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near doubling in the number of private foundations between 1992
and 2002, “state and federal money spent monitoring them
6
remained flat or declined.”
Charities are generally thought of as organizations that
7
perform good works and serve public policy. This perspective has
historical underpinnings and guides our legal view of such
8
organizations to this day.
Despite this public purpose, the
nonprofit sector is often marked by a lack of accountability to the
9
public. This is exacerbated by the fact that “[a] distinguishing
feature of the nonprofit sector is the freedom within which its
10
component entities are allowed to operate.”
Charitable organizations often fall short of the lofty ideals we
ascribe to them. Just as the for-profit sector has experienced its
share of scandals in recent years, so too has the non-profit sector
11
been tarnished by illicit activity. Between 1995 and 2002, “[h]ighlevel charity officials stole or misused at least $1.28-billion from 152
nonprofit organizations . . . , but the organizations recovered less
than half that amount while many perpetrators received minor
12
punishment.”
As substantial as these numbers are, they likely
understate the problem. The figures are based on newspaper
accounts of charity fraud; because many of those accused of
impropriety are not prosecuted, a substantial number of incidents
13
probably never make the headlines.

organizations).
6. Id.
7. Obviously people have competing ideas about what constitutes a “good
work” and what direction public policy should take. Likewise, nonprofit
organizations range across the socio-political spectrum. Although any given
organization reflects a particular view of public good, nonprofits, taken as a whole,
may arguably be seen as pursuing public purposes and fulfilling societal needs,
broadly defined.
8. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Greater Scrutiny for Nonprofits, 90 A.B.A. J. 51
(June 2004) (noting the origins of nonprofits’ tax-exempt status in seventeenthcentury English common law).
9. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218,
222.
10. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 1.
11. See Fishman, supra note 9, at 219 n.1 (providing examples of recent
scandals involving nonprofit organizations).
12. Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1-Billion, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27, 2003, at 26.
13. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/11

2

Kruse: Sin, Salvation, and the Law of Charities
KRUSE BKREV(LS & CB).DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 9:46:10 PM

SIN, SALVATION, AND THE LAW OF CHARITIES

385

THE LAW OF NONPROFITS
Although Marion Fremont-Smith’s new book is entitled
Governing Nonprofit Organizations, its focus is on that segment of the
nonprofit sector described as “charitable.”
Charitable
organizations form the principal part of the sector and are the
organizations that are most closely aligned with the original focus
14
of the law of nonprofits. They can be distinguished from other
nonprofits, such as fraternal organizations, labor organizations, or
15
credit unions, by virtue of their “public focus.”
Fremont-Smith begins by presenting a brief overview of the
nonprofit sector in the twenty-first century. She then embarks on a
detailed and surprisingly interesting discussion of the history of the
“law of charities.” An early system of regulation arose in the
16
ecclesiastical courts of medieval England.
During this period . . . charitable gifts acquired three
distinct characteristics that still survive: (1) the privilege of
indefinite existence; (2) the privilege of validity even if
the gift is in general terms, so long as its objective is
exclusively charitable; and (3) the privilege of obtaining
fresh objects if those laid down by the founder become
incapable of execution, known today as the doctrine of cy
17
pres.
The starting point for the modern law of charities, however, is
18
the Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601. The purpose of
the statute was to encourage and organize “private almsgiving” by
correcting abuses in the administration of charitable gifts and by
19
listing a variety of specific “charitable purposes.”
This statute had a profound impact on the development of
14. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 3. Determining which organizations are
properly defined as “charitable” is not always easy. In popular terms, however, a
charity may be thought of as an organization whose raison d’etre is some type of
“public benefit.” See id. at 3-4.
15. Id. at 5. This distinction is, of course, of limited utility. Nonprofit
organizations are generally considered to be those granted exemption from
income tax by the Internal Revenue Service. Charitable organizations may thus be
defined as those falling under section 501(c)(3) or, in some cases, section
501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally id. at 4-8 (discussing the
various categories of nonprofits).
16. Id. at 22. We may trace this farther back still: the medieval English laws
have their origins in Roman concepts of charities. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 28. This statute was also known as the Statute of Elizabeth. Id.
19. Id. at 29.
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charitable organizations in both England and, later, the United
20
States. It set the groundwork for the proliferation of charitable
trusts in both nations, albeit not without some difficulty. In 1819,
the Supreme Court decided Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist
21
Association v. Hart’s Executors and threw into doubt the very validity
22
of charitable trusts. In Hart, Justice Marshall determined that “the
law of charitable trusts had its origins in, and was based upon, the
Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601, and that with the repeal of that
statute by Virginia in 1792, any trust without beneficiaries who were
23
definitely named was invalid.” The holding, however, was based
on the erroneous impression that charitable trusts did not exist in
24
England prior to the statute. They had, in fact, existed before this
25
time; the statute simply increased their popularity. Although Hart
26
was reversed twenty-five years later, it continued to influence the
development of charitable trusts in a number of states, including
27
Minnesota.
Although charitable trusts remained the primary form of
charitable organization for many years, the rise of the corporate
form in American business led to an ever-increasing use of that
28
form for charitable purposes as well. Charitable corporations can
29
be found in the (soon to be) United States as far back as 1756;
however, use of the corporate form really took off following World
30
Today, the nonprofit corporation is the predominant
War II.
31
form of charitable organization in the United States.
The bulk of Fremont-Smith’s book is devoted to a lengthy
discussion of the creation and regulation of charitable
organizations in the United States. Although other organizational
forms are available, charities are usually created in the legal form of

20. Id. at 28-29.
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
22. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 44-45.
23. Id. at 44.
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id.
26. Hart was reversed by Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127
(1844), in which the Court held that charitable trusts could be recognized in the
United States regardless of statutes abolishing English laws. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 49-50.
29. See id. at 50 (discussing a corporate charter granted by the Massachusetts
General Court to promote public education).
30. Id. at 52-53.
31. Id. at 116; Fishman, supra note 9, at 225.
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32

either a corporation or a trust. The applicable legal standards
vary substantially depending upon which organizational form is
33
used.
34
Directors of all nonprofit organizations are fiduciaries.
Exactly what this fiduciary relationship entails, however, depends
35
upon the organizational form of the nonprofit.
Fiduciary
responsibilities for directors of charitable trusts are governed by
36
In contrast,
“restrictive and demanding” trust law principles.
regulation of charitable corporations is built on a “more lenient”
37
foundation of business corporate law. As a result, the choice of
organization entails a trade-off between the greater flexibility of the
corporate form and the higher standard of care embodied in the
38
trust.
“A distinguishing feature of charity regulation is that it is a
dual system, with state and federal rules and enforcement programs
39
that parallel each other to a large degree.” This has not always
been the case; regulation of charities fell almost exclusively to the
40
states until the enactment of federal tax laws in the early 1900s.
These laws marked the beginning of a dual system that persists to
41
this day.
The primary responsibility for the oversight of charities rests
42
with the states. “Charities are the creatures of the states, and the
laws governing their establishment, their right to continuous
existence, their freedom to operate, any limitations on the nature
of their holdings, and the conditions for their dissolution have

32. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 116. Among the other organizational forms
available are voluntary associations and limited liability companies (LLCs). Id.
33. Id. at 117. See also Fishman, supra note 9, at 222-27 (discussing the forms
of organization and the varying legal standards that accompany them).
34. Fishman, supra note 9, at 227.
35. See generally GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 187-211 (discussing the distinct
fiduciary duties of directors of charitable trusts and charitable corporations).
36. Fishman, supra note 9, at 225.
37. Id. The question of whether trust or corporate fiduciary standards should
apply to directors of charitable corporations was not clearly answered until the
latter half of the twentieth century. Now, however, “the majority of states have
opted to apply the more lenient [corporate] standards . . . .” GOVERNING, supra
note 3, at 200.
38. See Fishman, supra note 9, at 225-26.
39. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 428.
40. Id. at 53-54.
41. Id. at 54.
42. Id. at 377.
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43

been and continue to be determined at the state level.”
Within the states, enforcement of the fiduciary duties of the
managers of charitable organizations is, with rare exceptions, left to
44
the courts. In such a system, the attorneys general are charged
almost exclusively with the enforcement of laws governing
45
charitable trusts and corporations. This provides them with an
enormous amount of potential power to wield over nonprofits.
The range of court actions that an attorney general may
request a court to take to enforce fiduciary duties is as
broad as the power of the courts to devise remedies for
breach of fiduciary duties. He may request accountings,
removal of trustees, dissolution of corporations, forced
transfer of corporate property, or a combination of these.
He may ask the court to force charitable fiduciaries to
restore losses caused by breach of duty and to return
profits made in the course of administering the trust. He
may seek to enjoin trustees from further wrongdoing or
from continuing certain specific actions. Furthermore,
transactions involving a breach of the duty of loyalty may
be voided at the option of the attorney general unless he
decides that it is in the public interest to affirm them. The
attorney general, as well as trustees, may bring actions
requesting modification or deviation from the terms of a
46
trust or cy pres application of funds.
In most states, the enforcement powers of attorneys general
have been enhanced in the years since World War II by a variety of
47
regulations and reporting statutes. Minnesota is among the states
to have adopted such a statute, enacting the Supervision of
48
49
Charitable Trusts and Trustees Act in 1989. This Act requires
charitable trusts and foundations to register with the attorney
50
51
general’s office, provide copies of all tax information, and notify
43. Id.
44. Id. at 301. Supervision of some aspects of administration of charities may
be provided by agencies such as departments of health or education or secretaries
of state. See id. at 364-70.
45. Id. at 301.
46. Id. at 309. There are, of course, limits to this power. See id. at 309-11.
47. See id. at 311-21. A number of these were modeled after the Uniform Act
for Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes. Id. at 312-14.
48. MINN. STAT. §§ 501B.33-.45, codified by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 340, art. 1, §
25.
49. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 313. Although the Act makes no reference to
the Uniform Act, it contains similar provisions. Id.
50. MINN. STAT. § 501B.37, subd. 2 (2003).
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the attorney general of any court proceedings involving the
52
organization. It also provides that all records will be open for
53
public inspection and allows the attorney general to bring a civil
54
suit against managers for breach of trust. Organizations formed
55
as corporations are separately regulated under Chapters 309 and
56
317A of the Minnesota Statutes.
Such power obviously carries with it the potential for misuse.
Fremont-Smith notes two “disturbing trends” in state regulation of
57
charities.
The first is the use of the threat of litigation by
attorneys general to force charities into settlements that are
substantially more restrictive than required by law or likely to be
58
imposed by courts.
The second is the “politicization” of the
59
regulation of charities by attorneys general.
The politicization of regulation has raised questions
60
nationally.
Of particular concern is the idea that attorneys
general are becoming “headhunters,” using their regulatory power
61
to replace board members with hand-picked successors. Although
this is an issue in many states, “no other attorney general has drawn
more attention for such appointments than Mike Hatch of
62
Minnesota.”
Proponents argue that such actions are nothing
more than zealous guardianship of charitable assets. Opponents
express concerns with the ethical dangers of attorneys general
63
regulating their own appointees.
The primary federal source of regulation for nonprofits is the
64
Internal Revenue Service. For many charities, assuring that they
51. MINN. STAT. § 501B.38, subd. 1 (2003).
52. MINN. STAT. § 501B.41, subd. 2 (2003).
53. MINN. STAT. § 501B.39 (2003).
54. MINN. STAT. § 501B.41, subd. 7 (2003).
55. MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-.72 (2004) (regulating Social and Charitable
Organizations).
56. MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.001-.909 (2004) (regulating Nonprofit
Corporations).
57. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 446-47.
58. Id. at 446.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Strong-Arm Shaking of Charities Raises Ethics
Qualms, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at A22.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally id.
64. See generally GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 238-41 (providing an overview of
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which confers tax-exempt status on
a variety of organizations such as religious organizations, child-care organizations
and social welfare organizations).
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will be exempt from federal taxes and eligible to receive tax65
Most
deductible contributions is a major consideration.
charitable organizations are granted exemption from taxes under
66
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, but certain
“social welfare organizations” are exempt under section
67
501(c)(4).
Despite the importance of the IRS in regulating charities, this
role was not foreseen when Congress first voted to grant tax
68
exemptions to charitable organizations. “In fact, it is only since
1969 that the Service became an effective regulator of fiduciary
behavior and not until the end of the twentieth century that this
69
power was extended to the vast majority of charitable fiduciaries.”
Current IRS regulation has a number of components. The
Service issues revenue rulings on points of law and revenue
70
procedures that address the process for dealing with the IRS
They are legally binding on the Service, but are subject to court
71
Information releases and notices issued by the Service
review.
72
likewise have the force of law. The IRS also issues private letter
rulings, general counsel memos, and technical advice
73
memoranda. Such determinations are “private” and therefore not
precedential; however, they do provide legal guidance for
74
organizations.
Finally, the Internal Revenue Code allows for
75
76
This
public disclosure of returns from exempt organizations.
77
allows for a certain level of public oversight of nonprofits.
As a last resort, tax matters may be litigated. Litigation with
78
respect to these matters is bifurcated in the federal system. With
65. See generally id. at 238-52 (explaining the basic requirements for obtaining
and retaining tax-exempt status as well as the permitted purposes of tax-exempt
charities).
66. Id. at 238.
67. Id. at 239. Unlike 501(c)(3) organizations, 501(c)(4) organizations are
not barred from lobbying activities. They are, however, under the same
prohibition against participation in elections. Id.
68. Id. at 299-300.
69. Id. at 300.
70. Id. at 395.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 396.
73. Id. at 396-97.
74. Id. at 397.
75. The word “return” is broadly interpreted. See id.
76. Id. at 397-98.
77. See id. at 398-400 (discussing Freedom of Information Act inquiries).
78. Id. at 400.
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the exception of litigation in the Tax Court, all civil litigation
arising under revenue laws is handled by the Justice Department’s
79
Tax Division.
Additionally, the Justice Department conducts
80
criminal tax prosecutions.
There are also several other federal agencies that help regulate
charities. The FBI’s Economic Crimes Unit investigates allegations
of fraud in telemarketing, federal government procurement, and
81
federally funded programs. Although there is no charity-specific
investigation classification, some of the organizations investigated
82
are nonprofits.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) works with charities in coordinating disaster relief
83
operations.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces
consumer protection laws, some of which cover solicitation of
84
The United States Postal Inspection
charitable contributions.
Service combats mail fraud and has authority to investigate
85
charitable solicitations conducted through the mails. Finally, the
Office of Personnel Management “selects charities to which federal
employees may make their charitable contributions through a
86
coordinated appeal.”
The final chapter of Governing Nonprofits discusses recent
modifications in the regulation of charities and assesses some
proposals for future improvement. Much of the discussion
summarizes the previous chapters and points to the implications of
the dual system of supervision.
Prior to the 1970s, the state and federal regulatory regimes
had differing aims and utilized divergent enforcement
87
mechanisms. In contrast to the variety of sanctions available at
the state level, enforcement by the IRS was limited to revoking an
88
organization’s exemption. Such revocation often failed to remedy
the problem because charitable assets were seized while
89
wrongdoers went unpunished.
Federal options began to broaden with the passage of the Tax
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id.
Id. at 429-30.
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Reform Act of 1969, which allowed sanctions with respect to private
foundations for self-dealing and to managers who knowingly
90
approved the prohibited transactions. More recent changes have
served to bring the state and federal systems closer together by
91
aligning the fiduciary duties of the latter with the former. Under
the new federal rules, sanctions available with respect to publicly
supported charities are similar to those previously available in cases
92
of private foundation self-dealing.
In the wake of a number of highly publicized corporate
93
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.
Although this Act was aimed at curbing problematic behavior in
the for-profit sector, many of its provisions could be applied to the
94
nonprofit sector as well. Connecticut has already considered a bill
95
that would do just that, and it is likely that other states will follow
96
suit. Even without legal reforms, however, “it can . . . be expected
that there will be pressure on nonprofit institutions to borrow some
of the principles of good governance espoused by the Act for their
97
own purposes.”
Some commentators have proposed that better governance of
nonprofits could be effected by moving federal regulation from the
98
IRS to another existing or newly created agency or bureau. “The
most often mentioned suggestion... has been to move it from the
Service to a new independent body similar to the Charity
99
Commission in England or to a separate division within . . .
100
another federal agency.”
Fremont-Smith argues against such a change, noting that the
number of organizations regulated by the Charity Commission is
90. Id. at 429.
91. Id. at 430.
92. Id.
93. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
94. See, e.g., Szymanski, supra note 4 (discussing application of Sarbanes-Oxley
to nonprofits); Tebo, supra note 8 (same).
95. Szymanki, supra note 4, at 1305. Provisions applying such reforms to
nonprofits were omitted from the final bill. Id.
96. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 431.
97. Szymanski, supra note 4, at 1305.
98. See GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 461-66 (discussing proposals to change
the situs of federal regulation).
99. This commission, which has “broad regulatory as well as quasi-judicial
powers over charitable fiduciaries[,]” has regulated charities in England for over a
century. Id. at 464.
100. Id. at 462.
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far fewer than would fall under the auspices of a similar agency in
101
In addition, because deductibility of
the United States.
contributions is much more limited under British law, the scale of
102
oversight required is substantially less. Moreover, Fremont-Smith
notes that changes in the structure of the IRS in the last thirty years
have made it much more responsive to the needs of nonprofits and
its record in resisting political pressures “has been unusually
103
unblemished.” This, she says, “is an advantage that should not be
104
lost.”
While it is true that such an advantage should not be lost,
establishment of a separate agency to govern nonprofits does not
mean that it would be lost. Fremont-Smith suggests as much,
however, without explaining why this would occur.
Fremont-Smith advocates, at minimum, two changes in
nonprofit law. First, and in her view the most important, would be
“to remove the almost complete protection from liability given to
105
fiduciaries in the latter part of the twentieth century.”
Such a
proposal would provide greater accountability. The primary
drawback may be an increased reluctance of individuals to take on
positions of responsibility. This could present an especially
significant problem for smaller organizations that rely heavily on
volunteer leadership because the possibility of lawsuits may
discourage some from becoming involved. Whether or not this
would be a significant impediment for charities is difficult to judge.
Fremont-Smith’s second proposal is to provide greater funding
to regulatory agencies to allow them to more effectively carry out
106
their enforcement duties.
While certainly beneficial, whether
such action would find support in the current fiscal environment
remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Governing Nonprofits presents a detailed summary of the laws
governing charitable organizations. It is unlikely that attorneys
experienced in the area of nonprofit law will find much new in this
work. Nonetheless, the book would prove useful for students or for
practitioners who occasionally work with charities and desire an
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 471.
Id.
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overview of the legal landscape. Fremont-Smith’s book is most
valuable with respect to federal law. Its utility regarding state law is
more limited due to variations among multiple jurisdictions;
however, the book does provide a synopsis of general trends.
Particularly helpful in dealing with multi-jurisdictional issues is
the appendix. It contains several tables summarizing the laws of
each state governing the creation, administration, and dissolution
of charities; the standards for applicability of the cy pres doctrine in
each jurisdiction; and the fiduciary duties required in each state.
These tables provide a handy roadmap to the applicable sections in
each state’s statutes.
My primary criticism of Governing Nonprofits relates to FremontSmith’s discussion of proposed improvements to laws governing
charities. I would have preferred a more detailed assessment and
analysis regarding various suggestions. After the detailed history
and analysis of current state and federal law, the discussion of
proposals for future reforms seemed incomplete.
Such criticism aside, Governing Nonprofits provides a functional
general reference to the law of charities.
Students and
practitioners looking for an introduction to this area may find it a
useful addition to their bookshelves.
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